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Profit  manipulation  has  been  largely  studied  through  Positive  Accounting  Theory  (PAT). 
However, the weakness of the results obtained would suggest using different theoretical and 
methodological approaches to examine this subject. In France, management controllers play a 
central role in profit manipulation. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of their profit 
manipulation practices. Using results from 32 interviews in 13 companies, we argue that the 
spread of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model has fostered such behaviour. Far from 
the opportunism hypothesis supported by positive accounting theory, profit manipulation is 
used as a tool by management controllers to gain broader legitimacy within organizations 
and/or to adopt what they claim to be ethical behaviour. 
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Introduction 
In the light of recent corporate scandals, accounting today as an objective way of presenting 
economic reality is suffering from a real crisis of confidence. Central to the Anglo-Saxon 
system  of  corporate  governance,  it  has  been  pushed  into  the  public  spotlight,  where  its 
impartiality and objectivity is being questioned. 
 
Even  though  most  of  the  scandals  have  taken  place  in  the  United  States,  the  crisis  of 
confidence  has  had  an  impact  far  beyond  US  borders,  as  the  Anglo-Saxon  system  of 
governance is spreading throughout continental Europe and particularly in France (Pesqueux, 
2000). 
 
In order to contain the crisis, the United States and France are committed to institutional and 
legal reform. Moreover, those identified as having perpetrated such manipulation, essentially 
auditors  and  financial  directors,  have  been  legally  sanctioned.  We  should  nonetheless 
question whether these legal and legislative measures will be sufficient to restore long-term 
confidence in the system. Shouldn’t the social dimension of the issue be taken into account 
(Colasse, 2003)? Isn’t it necessary first to understand the reasons behind profit manipulation 
and how it functions before changing legislation? 
 
Tenants of Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) have represented the mainstream of accounting 
research since the early 80s. They see profit manipulation, which they euphemistically call 
“earnings management”
1, from an exclusively economic standpoint. Due to poor empirical 
results, this program of research has led to a crisis in accountancy research today (Reiter, 
1998) and teaches us little about the behaviour of the actors in this field. Indeed, Macintosh 
(1995,  p.296)  emphasises  the  “need  to  know  a  lot  more  about  the  profit  manipulation 
behaviour of managers in organizations”. 
 
In this article, we have opted for a comprehensive and sociological perspective in exploring 
the reasons behind the increased adoption of profit manipulation. Such manipulations affect 
both internal and external reporting (Macintosh, 1995). We will focus on manipulation of 
internal reporting, which is now closely related to external reporting (Macintosh, 1995). Since 
the guardians of internal information reliability in France are, to a large extent, management 
controllers, we have gathered data from this group of people. 
 
The purpose of this article is to bring together several components in order to construct a 
answer to the following question: How and why do management controllers take part in profit 
manipulation? Using theoretical and practical investigation, this study aims to understand the 
influence that corporate governance may exert on profit manipulation in major organisations. 
 
Analysing  interview  data  from  thirteen  companies  in  France  has  persuaded  us  that 
shareholder pressure leads management controllers to manipulate their firm’s profits. Going 
                                                 
1 The choice of terms is not a benign one. This expression hides the fact that earnings are the part that goes to 
capitalists after fighting with the other parties involved. It gives the impression that it is simply a measure of 
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beyond  individual  responsibility,  our  research  shows  that  the  organisation  imposed  on  a 
company by its shareholders with the aim of respecting criteria of Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance is itself the cause of accounting manipulation at all levels.  
 
First, we will define the notion of “earnings management”, present a range of practices, and 
assess  the  role  of management controllers in this phenomenon. We will then present our 
analysis  of  the  empirical  data.  We  will  observe  that  management  controllers  implement 
different  methods  for  manipulating  profit.  Then,  we  will  propose  a  model  to  explain  the 
behaviour of management controllers in companies in France, highlighting the influence of 
corporate  governance  and  shareholder  pressure.  Skill  in  profit  manipulation  enables 
management controllers to gain legitimacy in the eyes of managers working in a cultural 
context that is traditionally difficult for them. They soon become indispensable strategic allies 
playing  the  role  of  arbiter between the markets’ short-sightedness and the imperatives of 
operational management. The results presented will enable us to analyse the relevance of an 
Anglo-Saxon  model  of  governance  to  a  French  cultural  context  and  the  inherent 
contradictions of its theoretical foundation: agency theory. 
Profit Manipulation: an Overview  
Definition and Incentives 
Schipper (1989, p.92) proposes a representative academic definition of profit manipulation 
that she refers to as “earnings management”, similarly to the vast majority of literature on this 
subject.  She  defines  profit  manipulation  as:    “a  purposeful  intervention  in  the  external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. 
 
Healy  and  Walhen  (1999,  p.370)  identify  two  main  incentives  for  profit  manipulation: 
contracts  written  in  terms  of  accounting  numbers;  and  capital  market  expectations  and 
valuation. 
 
The  first  perspective  is  supported  by  the  tenants  of  positive  accounting  theory  (Watts  & 
Zimmerman, 1990). They suggest that contracts between the firm and its stakeholders create 
incentives  for  earnings  management.  Precisely,  they  propose  three  hypotheses  (Watts  & 
Zimmerman, 1990, p.138): the bonus plan hypothesis (directors who benefit from bonuses 
tied to profits are more prone to using accounting techniques that transfer future profits into 
the present); the debt/equity hypothesis (the more a company is in debt, the more it is in its 
interest to focus on present earnings because debt covenants, common in the United States, 
require certain levels of profitability); and the political cost hypothesis (the larger a company, 
the more it is in its interest to postpone its profits until a future accounting period to face any 
risk of burdensome legislation being implemented). 
 
The second perspective suggests that the goal of earnings manipulation is to be in line with 
the expectations of the financial markets. Dechow and Skinner (2000, p.247) underline that 
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capital  markets  on  earnings  management  and  that  “this  focus  has  been  sustained  by  the 
assumption that markets are efficient”. 
Profit Manipulation: a Range of Practices 
Profit manipulation can take two forms: earnings management and falsification (Merchant, 
1990, p.300). Earnings management involves postponing the period affected by an operation 
by changing the measurement methods
2, speeding up a sale or delaying a purchase. Here, we 
can make out in the background earnings management as limited to manipulating accounting 
figures, rather than to profit manipulation that involves acting on real business situations. 
Falsification involves disclosing wrongful data. In this case, such actions may be considered 
criminal. However, the fine line between these two types of manipulation remains blurred. 
 
Several  profit  manipulation  strategies  can  be  applied:  smoothing  reduces  the  variance  of 
earnings and therefore to reduce perceived risk; big bath accounting wipes the slate clean for 
a  new  appointed  director;  or  quite  simply  opportunistic  management,  the  phenomenon 
supported by tenants of positive accounting theory. Long before the Enron and Worldcom 
scandals,  SEC  chairman  Arthur  Levitt  (1998)  condemned  the  “game  of  nods  and  winks” 
during a speech at New York University, and portrayed “the game that runs counter to the 
very principles behind the market’s strength and success”. He identified some of the most 
popular  practices  of  earnings  management:  “big  bath”  restructuring  charges,  creative 
acquisition  accounting,  “cookie  jar  reserves”,  “immaterial”  misapplications  of  accounting 
principles,  and  the  premature  recognition  of  revenue.  Crossing  these  practices  with  the 
typology proposed by Dechow & Skinner (2000) provides a comprehensive presentation of 
the practices most observed currently, whether or not they violate GAAP (see Table 1). 
 
These examples highlight common U.S. and French practices of earnings management. We 
observe that practices do not fundamentally differ, but are adapted to local accounting rules. 
Some of these techniques are the privilege of “headquarters” level, i.e. boardrooms deciding 
to manipulate corporate results so that consolidated accounts provide the “expected” figures. 
Other practices presented below are also used at other levels in the organisations.  
 
Regarding the scarcity of French examples, the inefficiency of the COB (Commission des 
Opérations de Bourse), the French equivalent to SEC, is frequently underlined. For instance, 
in the Vivendi Universal case, “ the COB, which have begun an inquiry fifteen days after the 
fall down of J.M. Messier, and which should have rapidly written a report, still have not 
disclosed anything. Two full-time reviewers alone are dedicated to this layer, for examining 
the seized materials, enclosed the 80 tons sent by the SEC last February. We can observe the 
same discretion from the financial squad. Following a spectacular search in December 2002, 
at Vivendi headquarters and at the major protagonists’ offices, and then discrete inquiries at 
Goldman  Sachs,  in  April,  everything  came  down  to  silence.  Even  the  political  and  the 
business circles proved a lack of concern.” (Orange, 2003) 
 
< Insert Table 1 Here > 
                                                 
2 For example, by choosing what events are taken into account in a given period, the number of periods affected 
by an event and the impact on each period, and the way of classifying events in the profit & loss account 
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< Insert Table 1 (continued-1) Here > 
 
< Insert Table 1 (continued-2) Here > 
Choosing a Different Level of Analysis to Study Profit Manipulation? 
PAT researchers almost exclusively focus on top-management level profit manipulation. We 
deny the hypothesis according to which the director is alone in making accounting decisions. 
The fact that accounting documents of large are the aggregation of accounting documents 
drawn up by managers with their own incentives and priorities may explain the divergences 
that appear in the empirical results of various studies conducted into earnings management. 
Internal contracting, most often covered in PAT, deals with the compensation hypothesis. In 
this area, results from different studies are contradictory (Guidry et al., 1999, p.114). Few 
studies in the context of PAT look at internal earnings management. Using data gathered from 
more than one hundred business units of one firm, Guidry et al. (1999, p. 114) show that 
business-unit managers manage earnings to obtain their bonuses. Ronen, Sadan and Snow 
(1977, p.12-13) assert that: “smoothing could be destined to (1) external users of financial 
statements, such as investors and creditors, and (2) management itself. More specifically, as 
far as management is concerned, it should be noted that the motivation to smooth income is 
not confined to top management. Lower management may attempt to smooth to look good to 
the  top  management.  They  may  try  to  meet  predetermined  budgets,  which  in  addition  to 
serving as forecasts, also act as performance yardsticks” (quoted by Stolowy & Breton, 2000, 
p.35). Similarly, Merchant (1990, p.297) states how data collected on profit manipulation at 
the highest levels of an organisation with a view to understanding profit manipulation is of 
little relevance. Using interview data, Merchant (1990) also points out that most business unit 
managers manipulate the performance of their units. 
 
There are few empirical studies on internal profit manipulation outside the scope of PAT. 
However, studies by Merchant (1990) and Berry and Otley (1975) are noteworthy. Using 
interviews complemented by questionnaires, Merchant states, “pressure to reach net earnings 
or  budgeted  expenses  encourages  managers  to  move  earnings  from  year  to  year  by 
manipulating the accounts” (Merchant, 1990, p.305). Using case studies, Berry and Otley 
(1975) show that profit manipulation depends in large part on the forecasting process. In fact, 
“at  each  level  in  the  organization  expectations  may  be  established  in  one  of  three  ways. 
Firstly,  an  independent  estimate  can  be  reached  independently  from  any  other  in  the 
organization. Secondly, an estimate can be reached by aggregating estimates made by lower 
levels in the organization […]. Thirdly, an estimate can be reached by disaggregating a higher 
level estimate” (Berry and Otley, 1975, p.176-177). Berry and Otley (1975, p.188-189) assert 
that one response to failure in reaching forecasts is “creative book-keeping […] there was 
evidence of a cross allocation of costs in order to protect units from external criticism and to 
protect  reputation.  The  organization  of  such  protection  was  an  imaginative  task  for  the 
accounting staff.” Lastly, they highlight another factor which explains profit manipulation: 
“The result of these case studies indicates that the interdependence of forecasts at different 
levels when forecasts have been made by disaggregating [...] may encourage managers to take 
a  series  of  defensive  positions  and  make  the  information  and  reporting  systems  opaque” 
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place  does  not  only  depend  on  how  accounting  is  used  to  evaluate  the  performance  of 
managers and their pay but also how forecasts are made that will be used as a baseline for 
such performance appraisal. Thus, the remuneration hypothesis put forward in the PAT does 
not suffice to explain internal profit manipulation. 
The Management Controller’s Role  
Discussing  an  article  by  Nelson  et  al.  (2002)  entitled  “Evidence  from  Auditors  about 
Managers’ and Auditors’ Earnings Management Decisions”, Gibbins (2002, p.205) asks to 
see  “the  auditor’s  role  more  fully  developed  and  more  distinguished  from  management’s 
intents”.  Richard and Reix (2002) propose a rich analysis of the relationship between the 
finance  director  and  the  auditor  in  the  audit  process  and  its  effects  on  the  audit  quality. 
Adopting a similar thought process, we have decided to focus on the management controller’s 
role and relationships with managers in the profit manipulation mechanism. 
 
The  person  who  manages  forecasting  and  consolidation  of  accounts  in  France  is  the 
management controller. If profit manipulation takes place, it is crucial to understand how and 
why  the  management  controller  would  be  driven  to  take  part  in it, when this role is the 
contrary to what the literature would lead us to believe.  
 
The central problem of management control is the convergence of the organisation’s goals 
with  those  of  its  members  (Anthony  &  Govindarajan,  2001,  1965).  In  other  words, 
management control must be envisaged as understanding implicit decision-making processes, 
taking into account the reciprocal impact on the decision-making process of networks and 
identities inside, as well as outside, the organisation (Mintzberg, 1983). The management 
controller’s  primary  mission  is  to  promote  this  convergence  of  goals  whilst  taking  into 
account the reciprocal influence of networks and identities.  
 
With  this  in  mind,  information  plays  a  crucial  role  (Simon  et  al.,  1955).  In  theory,  the 
management controller’s responsibility towards information should be similar to that of a 
telecommunications  company  which  guarantees  that  messages  circulate  throughout  the 
system in a clear, precise and rapid manner, without being responsible for their content or for 
acting upon the information they contain (Anthony, 1988). The central problem here derives 
from the ambiguity relating to the hierarchical and functional attachments of the controller 
who  is  in  charge  of  this  mission (Bouquin, 2001). The controller delivers information to 
managers but must also gather it from them in order to provide the board with “the right 
signals”, and to manage the risks taken by operational managers effectively. If he wishes to 
remain guardian of information reliability, he must display unwavering loyalty towards head 
office.  But,  in  that  case,  how  can  he  avoid  being  perceived  as  Big  Brother’s  lapdog  by 
operational managers? Moreover, he is running the additional risk in this situation of being 
sidelined from the truly relevant information, that which lies at the heart of the decision-
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Sample and Method 
How can we collect data on a subject as sensitive as manipulating profits? Indeed, “despite 
the popular wisdom that earnings management exists, it has been remarkably difficult for 
researchers to convincingly document it” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p.370). 
 
Using one of Copeland’s typologies (1968, p.105), Stolowy and Breton (2000) identify three 
types of empirical tests for earnings manipulation: (1) directly ascertaining from management 
by interview, questionnaire, or observation; (2) asking other parties such as CPA’s; or (3) 
examining financial statements and/or reports to governmental agencies to verify, ex post, if 
smoothing has occurred. 
Therefore, earnings management can be studied in two different ways. A so-called “objective 
way”  is  using  accounting  documents.  Another  method  of  collecting  data  is  to  use  the 
statements made by managers, accountants and auditors. PAT’s answer is to use objective 
measures extrapolated from financial statements. For our study, we are looking to understand 
how profit manipulation is developed within organisations and therefore we need to adopt a 
more “comprehensive” standpoint. 
 
In  this  case,  data  gathering  was  conducted  using  semi-directive  interviews.  Thirty-two 
management controllers belonging to thirteen different companies were interviewed on the 
relatively general theme of their daily activity. During the interview, either in response to a 
question  that  arose  naturally  or  spontaneously,  they  mentioned  taking  part  in  profit 
manipulation.  This  method’s  main  advantage  is  offering  access  to  a  set  of  explanations 
provided  by  the  controller  himself.  We  have  therefore  focused  our  analysis  on  this 
explanatory  material,  particularly  rich  in  lessons  for  understanding  behaviour  relating  to 
earnings  management.  The  primary  limitation  is  the  conscious  desire  not  to  put  the 
interviewee on the defensive. As such, some questions remained unanswered by some of the 
controllers. We are interested in management controllers at varying staff levels because an 
individual’s views and participation in profit manipulation may vary according to rank.  
 
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
 
Management Controllers and Profit Manipulation 
Management controllers actively participate in profit manipulation. Several of them we were 
able to get close to described the kind of operations they’d performed in detail. Due to the 
very sensitive nature of the question, other controllers mentioned the importance of their 
accountancy skills or their experiences as auditors in their daily routine. 
 
The  work  that  management  controllers  perform  varies  from  simple  “beautifying”— 
presentation  know-how,  increasingly  highlighted  as  a  quality  essential  to  being  a  good 
management controller—to considerably more significant actions which resemble “cosmetic 
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From Simple Work on Presentation... 
There is much work on presentation, and communication is also important. We are here to say what is 
going on, but also to spotlight what is working well. Even if this is just to prepare the content of a 
financial statement later on. 
(Oil and Gas Industry, Zone Management Controller N°1). 
 
When you address members of the Board of Directors, you spend enormous amounts of time writing 
notes and doing presentations. […] Between two people, the one who will stand out is the one who 
gives the better presentation. That’s what we are appreciated for, it’s just the tip of the iceberg…  
(Beverages, Zone Management Controller N°1) 
 
The  importance  of  this  work  on  presentation  appears  to  be  growing.  It  seems  to  be  an 
absolutely essential skill for advancing in the profession. 
 
Towards the end of the period, you spend a day or two crunching numbers to produce something 
that holds water. Then, another important point in the controller’s routine, once he’s done his number 
crunching, is spending three days doing a presentation for the Board of Directors. […] 
That means, when someone asks a question, you are able to answer immediately either: 1/ I know where 
to find the information; 2/ I think I know how to shed a different light on it; 3/ I know how to 
integrate it into a table; 4/ I know how to present it in fine. That’s what I call the ability to model. 
(Beverages, Zone Management Controller N°2) 
 
We are far from an objective and impartial accounting presentation that is rationally used in 
the  decision-making  process  as  assumed  by  PAT  and  agency  theory  (Baiman,  1990).  It 
largely becomes a construct whose form matters as much as it’s content. 
...to Profit Manipulation 
Earnings management by companies is seen by a large number of controllers as a given. And 
controller participation in this process is widely recognised. 
 
All of the big groups pilot their results. They do what they want. 
(Media and Entertainment 2, Operational Management Controller) 
 
Without giving details of the techniques used, some controllers emphasise their accounting 
skills. A second branch management controller from the Oil and Gas Industry confided that 
he spent the largest part of his time answering questions on accounting from operational 
managers looking to optimise management of their accounts: 
 
At my level, you are asked lots of questions like: “How do we deal with this, how do we deal with that?” 
This is also due to my previous experience in a subsidiary in charge of the group’s consolidation for four 
years. I have an accounting background […] so I’m asked a lot of questions about accounting and how to 
optimise things. Looking into these questions takes up the greatest portion of my time. It’s all about 
talking  to  people,  answering  questions,  and  then  looking  at  the  final  reports  that  we  prepare  for 
validation. 
(Oil and Gas Industry, Branch Management Controller) 
 
The  site  financial  controller  for  an  Automobile  and  Parts  1  industry  emphasised  his  past 
experience  as  auditor.  He  points  out  that  this  sometimes  helps  in  getting  around  certain 
questions.  
 
You always have one eye on the accounts, since most of us have experience as auditors, and have an 
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(Automobile and Parts 1, Site Financial Controller) 
 
The opportunities and choices operated in terms of manipulation at business-unit level seem 
to depend on the sector of activity. Highly capital-intensive industries, which generate large 
sums of money for amortisation, have powerful levers at their disposal. In Table 3 below, we 
present three clear examples of profit manipulation reflexes. 
 
<Insert table 3 Here> 
 
We are far from what Anthony (1988) presents as the main role of the management controller, 
the “telecommunications company which guarantees that messages circulate throughout the 
system in a clear, precise and rapid manner, without being responsible for their content or for 
acting upon the information they contain.” In fact, as underlined by Moriceau and Villette 
(2001,  p.100),  the  management  controllers  “wield  the  magic  wand  of  figures,  that  magic 
which enables us to change reality into fact and fact into reality with a single click of the 
mouse”. 
Shareholder Pressure and Profit Manipulation 
Management controllers often mention the rise in shareholder pressure as one of the most 
important change factors in their profession in recent years. The rise in shareholder influence 
alters  the  very  nature  of  their  task  by  increasingly  focusing  on  reporting  and  budgetary 
control.  Shareholder  pressure  also  modifies  the  relations  that  controllers  maintain  with 
operational managers and what the latter see as the controller’s mission. What management 
controllers say leads us to investigate the link between growing shareholder pressure and 
significant profit manipulation. Analysing interview content has shown us that the greater the 
shareholder  pressure,  the  more  management  controllers  tend  to  take  part  in  profit 
manipulation. 
The Rise in Shareholder Pressure 
Management  controllers  see  the  rise  in  shareholder  pressure  as  being  one  of  the  most 
noticeable changes in their profession over the last ten years. 
 
I was head of finance in a subsidiary, so I had a budgetary function. We looked at earnings from a more 
accounting angle and we didn’t have the same routine and we didn’t have the same pressure of 
results either, that’s for sure.  
It’s  like  that  because,  having  prioritised  things  around  earnings  and  reporting,  we  create  earnings 
expectations. [...] The other important factor is financial communication. Before, we were in a system 
of half-yearly consolidated results, where things were fairly relaxed. Basically, because earnings for the 
month of June came out sometime in September, there were relatively few expectations from the 
financial markets. There were also delays in publication, figures were bigger and consolidation was a lot 
more difficult. Whereas, today, we publish our earnings on a quarterly basis, within much shorter 
time periods. The financial markets have expectations, especially when we see what our American 
competitors are doing… So yes, there is certainly expectations from the financial markets to know 
rapidly what’s happening, where we are…  
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It’s starting to change, because, like many other firms, X is looking towards creating shareholder value 
and, as a result, is developing this financial culture. That means that whilst one of our priorities is to 
develop markets and sell more, it is also to generate more profitability for shareholders. 
(Food producers and processors, Operational Management Controller) 
 
There are other groups in the Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sector, for example Servier, a French 
group not quoted on the stock market, which does not have this problem at all, because they have 
no accounts to disclose. They have the profitability of a pharmaceutical group, they are in good 
financial health, but they do not have performance targets. That means they do more science. They 
will be more focused on developing their drugs and on bringing them to market, because that is the 
heart of the matter: you have to produce products and sell them.  
(Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Business Unit Controller) 
 
In the Food producers and processors sector as in the Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 
sector, creating shareholder value seems to be an additional and even rival goal, in addition to 
what they consider to be the company’s "true" mission (developing markets, selling more or 
developing drugs for the Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology industry). It is interesting to see 
that management controllers do not consider creating shareholder value as a legitimate goal in 
absolute terms. In fact, they seem worried that creating shareholder value may damage the 
company’s long-term development. 
 
Transparency becomes a major goal. The branch management controllers in the Oil and Gas 
industry  underline  this  idea  of  transparency  achieved  using  accounting  documents.  These 
have a two-fold mission: providing internal steering information and communicating to the 
financial markets. 
 
There is a real need for everyone to increase awareness, because as we disclose results during the first 
two months, as soon as we have an idea of the result for the quarter, financial communication starts to 
think about what its message will be. “Are we in line with what we promised or not?” For the guys in 
foraging and production, their problem is knowing how much they are producing. We have made a 
promise—we said we were going to increase production of crude. If we don’t keep it, we know that our 
share price will drop.  
(Oil and Gas industry, Branch Management Controller N°2). 
 
The rise in frequency of disclosure, the predominant talk of creating value and transparency, 
and the diffusion of performance-based remuneration indicate the spread of the Anglo-Saxon 
model of governance in France.  
 
Corporate governance is characterised by “the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional 
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, 
how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake 
are  allocated  […]  corporate  governance  can  be  seen  as  the  institutional  matrix  that  links 
market signals to the decisions of corporate managers”  (Davis & Useem, 2002, p.235-236). 
The system of governance in Anglo-Saxon countries is of a “shareholder” type (as opposed to 
the  “stakeholder”  model  of  the  countries  in  continental  Europe)  (Plihon  et  al.,  2002). 
Monitoring  is  performed  a  posteriori  through  repurchasing,  by  financial  analysts  and 
shareholder  activism  (Shleifer  &  Vichny,  1997;  Davis  &  Useem,  2002).  In  this  context, 
transparency, which stems from reliable accounting information, is one of the criteria of good 
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priority for the directors and all the managers of a company
3. Accounting “helps the best-
performing  firms  in  the  economy  to  distinguish  themselves  from  poor  performers  and 
facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders” (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999, p.367). 
 
This means that “the representativeness of accounting information has to be guaranteed” and 
“this can only be achieved with regard to the reliability of internal control procedures in place 
in the company” (Pesqueux, 2000, p.30). Understanding the mindset that drives the number-
crunching professions, especially management controllers, therefore becomes crucial. 
 
Corporate governance in large French companies is today tending to align itself with the 
Anglo-Saxon system (Thiery-Dubuisson, 2002) and seems to be manifesting itself in the form 
of  greater  shareholder  pressure
4.  This  pressure  has  repercussions  on  the  management 
controller’s daily tasks, and on the relations they maintain with operational staff. 
Shareholder Pressure and the Management Controller’s Activities 
In  terms  of  the  tasks  themselves,  we  observe  the  growing  importance  of  reporting  and 
budgetary control activities, as underlined by a business unit management controller in the 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sector: 
 
Because we are part of an American company, we systematically look at the budgetary aspects. I 
have a friend who works at Servier and it’s amusing to note that, even though we have more or less 
the same position, we don’t do the same things at all. He goes to seminars and meetings where they 
discuss projects between controllers such as setting up ABC... It’s a lot more theoretical than what I am 
doing: I stick to the shop floor. We try to develop maximum collaboration with operational staff on a 
daily basis, and provide support for a financial approach to projects, for budgetary reallocations, and in 
the context of an American firm, for budgetary revisions that are close to daily realities, because we 
have quarterly goals that require very reactive steering.  
(Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sector, Business Unit Controller) 
 
Our [Management controller’s] position is becoming increasingly important, because shareholders are 
increasingly central to the running of companies. Today, shareholders are less often the man in the 
street,  and  increasingly  financial  groups,  such  as  pension  funds.  It’s  increasingly  true  that  the 
shareholder decides, so if your shareholder is a financier, the company must increasingly think like a 
financier. So, the financial function is not going to get less important over the coming years, in fact 
rather the contrary.  
(Food producers and processors, Director of Subsidiary Management Control). 
 
                                                 
3 Fligstein (1990) shows that it has not always been this way. It was in the course of the 20th century that 
American companies increasingly used accounting documents as a means of control (enabling the control of 
diversified activities and fulfilling a requirement for raising capital on the financial markets). He notes that in the 
French model, where the economic sector was controlled to a large extent by the State, control was operated 
implicitly through the socialisation of civil servants who graduate from the same Grandes Ecoles (Fligstein, 
1998). In this environment, accounting is not a major problem. Pesqueux (1999, p.66) adds that, under this 
model  of  government,  the  company  is  seen  “as  a  technical  process  which  must  be  governed  according  to 
technical specifications” and that public administration management methods are predominant. 
4  Finding  factors  that  explain  the  growth  in  corporate  governance  in  companies  in  France  is  an  issue  that 
stretches far beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, we should mention world financial deregulation, the 
growth of investment funds (Jeffers & Plihon, 2002) and the floating of major companies on American markets 
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The rise in shareholder pressure seems to have significantly modified the rhythm and the type 
of work executed by management controllers. They must “think financial communication” in 
the  way  they  present  their  results  or  goals  internally,  even  those  in  smaller  entities.  Our 
interviews  confirm  the  tendency  of  “integrating  the  roles  of  accountant  and  management 
controller  or  making  management  controllers  increasingly  obey  financial  imperatives” 
(Pesqueux, 2000, p.37). 
The Impact of Shareholder Pressure  
Management controllers purposefully cite shareholder pressure as a reason for performing 
accounting manipulations.  
 
Firstly, it seems that the board’s commitment vis-à-vis financial markets drives controllers to 
manipulate profit in order to cope with the “real life” situations. 
 
What  the  CEO  says  when  he  discloses  the  results  is  binding  for  us.  We  have  to  respect  our 
commitments to the financial markets. We have to sweeten the pill in terms of communication. To 
give an example, we have communicated on our core business, which will result in our selling equipment 
that is not on tap… But this proves more difficult than expected so we have to move the goal posts for 
what contracts count as part of our core business. 
(Utilities, Headquarters Zone Management Controller) 
 
Since we have large margins in the Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sector—there’s no secret about 
that—any  slump  in  sales  has  a  major  impact  on  the  bottom  line.  This  loss  of  earnings  has  to  be 
compensated  for,  because  the  stock  market  is  expecting  the  results  announced.  So,  we  try  to 
compensate for it. 
(Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sector, Business Unit Controller) 
 
You  find yourself hearing things from the financial director like: “What are these figures that keep 
changing all the time?” You see, they have figures on their minds and, for them, these figures are 
references. It’s true that, give or take a few thousand euros, it doesn’t change the world, so that’s what 
they  prefer.  This  is  because  you  have  communicated  on  certain  figures  that  become  baseline 
references. Once they have shown the figures, I can no longer say anything, even if I’ve made a mistake. 
So, you play around with things until you get it just right.  
(Media and Entertainment 2, Operational Management Controller) 
 
Once, after closure, I had to do the budget again! But this time, I had excellent results. What happened 
was the CEO was shown a figure, closure took place in December, and things were a complete mess. My 
budget was way out. So, I asked the units to readjust their budgets for 2003, and they asked me to send 
the updated budget, post-closure, so as to keep the same overall result as the one shown to the 
CEO… By putting extra expenses—“unforeseen costs/revenues” as we call them—in another column, 
the operational figure was modified, but this didn’t change the bottom line. But it could come back to 
haunt us this year. 
(Media and Entertainment 2, Operational Management Controller) 
 
Secondly, the increased frequency of financial communication complicates the task facing 
management controllers and forces them to recalculate their estimates constantly, making the 
disclosure of reliable figures difficult. 
 
We  are  just  beginning  quarterly  consolidation,  until  now  we’ve  been  on  a  more  or  less  half-yearly 
rhythm. The rule of thumb here is to be as precise and as close as possible to what is going to happen. 
The management controller has a role of co-steering accounting in a certain number of cases, including 
the  question  of  smoothing  a  number  of  expenses  and  forecasts.  The  management  controller  is 
drawn to any information which is of a financial nature, such as forecasts, risks, options that we are 








































0  13 
(Oil and Gas Industry, Branch Management Controller N°1) 
 
Lastly, the pressure of earnings expectations pushes everyone to cover their backs a priori or 
to manage earnings a posteriori. 
 
Earnings management does take place. When I was working with the director of management control, I 
accounted for certain figures as unforeseen expenses, as we called them. The branches didn’t know 
about these, and we never knew (and this still remains a mystery) if the CEO could read the expenditure 
tool and these notorious figures we called unforeseen expenses. This is ultra secret. In fact, all directors 
have in mind is reaching a given result [...]. You have so much shareholder pressure, and “I have to 
reach such and such a growth figure.” Sometimes, if you have excellent earnings, you hide some 
intelligently. At Z, each one of us does that within his branch, and afterwards you perform accounting 
operations that are completely legal. 
(Media and Entertainment 2, Operational Management Controller) 
 
For us—and I’m fairly sure it happens in most places—this over-exploitation of the "actual" is in line 
with the gradual decline of forecasting, due to pressure from the financial community. Since analysts 
expect a given result from me (benchmark versus competition, continued improvement, the holy grail of 
15%, etc.), why measure results using a internal budget, and not directly using this target figure?  
The controller is less of a forecaster, and even less an analyst of shortfalls (the two traditional pillars of 
the profession, which we learn concretely about the job at school), but rather the one who will make it 
happen. The question is no longer "what am I capable of reaching?", followed by many revisions of the 
budget and the analysis of "why have I deviated in one direction, or another", but "how am I going to 
reach this goal?", i.e. my action plan, followed by "how am I going to reach it despite the deviations?” 
 […] The additional ambiguity created by this shift is frightening. The title of co-pilot starts to take on its 
full meaning: we must land this plane in Buenos Aires by any means possible, and it is no longer 
acceptable to land in Stockholm with the excuse that the wind direction changed.” 
(Beverages, Zone Management Controller N°1) 
 
It would therefore appear that shareholder pressure is exerted through control systems at all 
levels of an organisation, resulting in a rise in profit manipulation, in line with Merchant’s 
findings  (1990).  What  drives  this  profit  manipulation  is  that  in  Anglo-Saxon  corporate 
governance “things must happen as they were forecast” (Pesqueux, 2000, p.37)
5 and this must 
be the case throughout the entire company. So, “the proliferation of transparency issues at all 
levels constitutes [...] a powerful relay reinforcing market pressure on how the company is 
steered” (Mottis & Ponssard, 2002)
6.  
 
Moreover, with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance on the rise, the forecasting of financial 
goals is dictated by the financial markets before being considered at organisation level. We 
find ourselves in a situation of “disaggregating forecasts”, which Berry and Otley (1975) 
present as encouraging profit manipulation.  Our results confirm that “the widespread use of 
accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks can create an 
incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short-term stock 
price performance” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p.371). Arthur Levitt, SEC chairman in 1998, 
was already denouncing this phenomenon: “While the problem of earnings management is not 
new, it has swelled in a market that is unforgiving of companies that miss their estimates. I 
                                                 
5 Indeed, many studies document that there are “an unusually large number of zeros and small positive forecast 
errors (cases where analyst forecasts are exactly met or just beaten) and an unusually small number of small 
negative forecast errors (near misses)” (Dechow and Skinner, 2000, p.243). 
6Johnson and Kaplan (1987) show that in the United States external demands in terms of accounting documents 
have led to the use of control systems based on external accounting and therefore highlight the impact on 
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recently read of one major U.S. company that failed to meet its so-called "numbers" by one 
penny and lost more than six percent of its stock value in one day.” Fox (1997) quoted the 
case of Microsoft corporation: “In January, for the 41
st time in the 42 quarters since it went 
public, Microsoft reported earnings that met or beat Wall Street estimates. The 36 brokerage 
analysts who make the estimates were, as a group, quite happy about this—the 57 cents per 
share announced by the software giant was above their consensus of 51 cents—but not so far 
above as to make them look stupid. Investors were happy too, bidding the already high-priced 
shares of the company up to 4% the first trading day after the announcement.” This hysteria 
can  be  explained  by  the  social  links  that  binds  actors:  “This  is  the  pattern  earnings 
management creates: companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order 
to grow market capitalization and increase the value of stock options. Their ability to do this 
depends  on  achieving  the  earnings  expectations  of  analysts.  And  analysts  seek  constant 
guidance from companies to frame those expectations. Auditors, who want to retain their 
clients, are under pressure not to stand in the way.” 
Profit Manipulation by Management Controllers: from a Search for Legitimacy to 
Ethical Aspirations 
Why  do  management  controllers  take  part  in  profit  manipulation  in  a  context  of  strong 
shareholder pressure? Two distinct types of behaviour come to the fore.  
 
In  companies  with  a  relatively  weak  financial  culture,  profit  manipulation  is  a  way  for 
management controllers to earn power and legitimacy with the operational managers they 
work with. It not only provides controllers recognition for their technical competence, often 
undervalued  in  the  past,  but  also  significantly  increases the zone of uncertainty they can 
manage effectively, both in their relations with operational managers and with management 
control at headquarters.  
 
In  firms  with  a  developed  financial  culture,  profit  manipulation  is  seen  in  the  eyes  of 
management controllers as an “ethical” stance, a solution to face the irrational dictate of the 
financial  markets.  Management  controllers  sense  the  dangers  of  an  exclusively  financial 
orientation (for themselves and for the company). In collaboration with operational managers, 
management controllers operate accounting adjustments to create room for manoeuvre for 
managers to achieve their strategic goals, without being systematically obsessed by “how 
their balance sheet looks”. Performing profit manipulation appears in their eyes as a way of 
adopting  a  new  role:  that  of  arbiter  between  market  expectations  and  business  reality, 
sometimes going as far as telling operational managers to forget the figures in order to take 
more risks.  
Profit Manipulation and the Search for Legitimacy by Controllers 
As we have already mentioned, one of the underlying problems that controllers face is the 
ambiguity relating to their hierarchical and functional attachment (Bouquin, 2001). In theory, 
the management controller’s position is clear: his mission is not to control, but to provide 
information  and  tools  to  help  managers  control  and  feed  headquarters  the  necessary 
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relationships rather more complex. In order to obtain information from distrusting operational 
managers,  the  management  controller  must  demonstrate  the  added  value  he  provides  and 
build  a  relationship  of  confidence  with  managers.  To  highlight  how  real  this  need  for 
legitimisation is, it is interesting to compare the vision of a director of management control 
and the experience of two subsidiary management controllers.   
 
The second principle that governs our activity is the total immersion of management controllers in the 
various professions as well as in projects. So, for example, the director of manufacturing has his own 
management controller with a small team, each factory has a management control department, and it’s the 
same  for  sales  and  the  international  entities.  These  teams  report  hierarchically  to  their  boss  and 
functionally to myself. 
(Automobile and Parts 2, C.F.O.) 
 
Both a Beverages and a Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology management controller give vivid 
illustrations of what relationship issues lie behind the hierarchical structure. 
 
This situation is very ambiguous. My first choice is always not to break the link with the operational 
manager, otherwise you have to change jobs or else change positions, because it is either him or you 
who walks. But if you ever get to breaking point—“I disagree so much with what you are saying that I’m 
going to blow the whistle”—you fall into the last category. Thankfully, this doesn’t happen very often. 
[...] 
If  you  just  stay  a  controller—handling  and  looking  at  figures  and,  if  it’s  not  right,  saying 
something—you  will  never  win  the  operational  managers’  trust.  They  will  always  see  you  as  a 
controller, and you will never quite understand the reality and the drivers of the business. […] 
That means you really have choices to make and convictions to apply. 
(Beverages, Zone Management Controller N°1) 
 
When the new boss of the BU arrived, the first week was hell, because he didn’t say anything to us. So, I 
had to involve my superiors by saying, "It’s not possible… this situation is not tenable." There was zero 
confidence, no involvement in meetings, no invitation, no information. 
As soon as I entered his sphere of activity wearing my management controller hat... it was, "lock 
the doors, batten down the hatches". I was the cop who was going to cut all his budgets... So, I had 
to tell him, "Wait a minute, you don’t understand". We are not here to stop you from working, on the 
contrary. We have a support function and we must exchange information. 
(Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology sector, Business Unit Controller) 
 
Only one choice is open to the management controller looking to work in the right conditions: 
turn  the  operational  manager  into  a  strategic  ally.  Profit  manipulation  seems  a  good 
opportunity  for  the controller to show off his technical expertise (often voluntarily toned 
down in the past to distinguish ‘controller’ from ‘accountant’) and, as a result, to increase his 
power within the organisation (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977)
7. 
 
Of course, you can move reserves from one year to the next… Well, let’s say it’s something you do fairly 
naturally because it also makes things easier for you […]. You do it up to a certain point and then from 
time to time you tell yourself: “No, that’s too much. I have to be careful.”  
Again, if you have relations based on trust with your operational superior, it’s ok. If you don’t have this 
kind of relationship—you have to go and see him, saying, “No, wait, I’ll go as far as here but no further. 
This reserve could be useful to the group for something else, to reinvest elsewhere, etc.” In practice, 
he’s going to agree with you because he knows that you are the one who wields the pen at the end 
                                                 
7 “The first major source of power involves possessing skills in a functional specialisation which is difficult to 
replace. The expert is the only one who has the know-how, the knowledge and experience of a given situation, 
which enable him to solve certain critical problems for the company. […] Once the efficient running of an 
activity, a sector or an important function for the organisation depends on him, he will be able to negotiate for 
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of the day. If he really doesn’t agree, you’re going to have to make a decision alone…. Since you have 
your network, you make a few phone calls off-the-record to spread the word, so that someone phones 
him up and asks, “Hey, if you happen to have lots of reserves, it would really help us out if you could 
free some of them up”. You try to show a little political acumen in this situation, and if that doesn’t work, 
at that point, you are forced to denounce your boss, which is never good. It’s better to avoid doing 
that. 
(Beverages, Zone Management Controller N°2) 
 
In companies where controllers traditionally lack legitimacy, the growing importance given to 
financial communication provides an opportunity to play a new role in the organisation. The 
controller  becomes  a  “double  borderline  mover”—double  marginal  secant  (Crozier  & 
Friedberg,  1977)
8—acting  in  the  zone  where  the  unit  and  headquarters  cross,  and  where 
financial markets and the company meet.  
Profit Manipulation as an Ethical Act 
In  companies  with  a  developed  financial  culture,  management  controllers  have  perfect 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, the rise in shareholder pressure only serves to exacerbate the feeling 
amongst controllers that all the actors in a company only care about the accounting priorities 
of their activity. This raises the question of their own added value, in relation to operational 
managers  who  are  totally  under  control  because  they  only  think  in  terms  of  ratios  and 
bonuses. In this case, profit manipulation takes on a quasi-ethical aspect. On the one hand, 
perceiving  the  risk  of  financial  drift  in  the  company’s  long-term  prospects,  management 
controllers look to play an arbiter’s role by managing earnings, leaving operational managers 
to do their work without being obsessed by the accounting point of view. On the other hand, 
they can play the role of counterweight to operational managers looking to take advantage of 
weaknesses in the compensation system.  
 
The accounting viewpoint is: "the cost is this much, your budget is this much, you have spent that much". 
That’s accounting. We have to do it. Well, we have to gather the information. But afterwards, it’s all 
about perception when you say: "OK, what’s important in this factory? What do we have to do? 
Where are our risks? How can we orientate things?” 
[…] We have to be able to understand people’s problems as well. We have to understand the factory’s 
needs. If someone needs to spend 100,000 francs, and, as a result, will save 2 million, well, even if he 
overshoots his budget, you have to make a choice. We cannot be completely blinkered. 
(Food producers and processors, Factory Management Controller) 
 
You are in a situation where you know that a manager is passing off all his marketing expenses as sales 
expenditure—these are sections of the accounts that closely interact—because for him it is a way of 
increasing  volume  quickly.  Seen  from  above,  it’s  not  because  we  are  building  brands  or  because  it 
disrupts the market… Your own conviction will be somewhere in between: “OK, on the one hand, I 
have people who are technocrats. They think that if I do some advertising, everything will be fine, 
that I don’t need to set sales targets. On the other side, I have salesmen who are looking to make 
                                                 
8 “The second major source of power we find in an organisation relates to all the uncertainties which develop 
around  the  relationship  between  the  organisation  and  its  environment  […]  An  organisation’s  "relevant 
environments", meaning the segments of society which the company is in contact with, always and inevitably 
constitute a source of potential disruption for its internal functioning, and, as such, a major and inescapable zone 
of uncertainty. Individuals or groups who, through their diverse contacts and capital of relations in such and 
such a segment of the environment, are able to control this zone of uncertainty, at least in part, will possess as a 
natural  consequence  considerable  power  within  this  zone.  This  power  is  called  “double  borderline  mover” 
(double-marginal-sécant), meaning an actor who has a stake in several action systems in contact with each other 
and who, due to this fact, may play the indispensable role of intermediary and interpreter between the different, 
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their lives easier, etc.”  You are going to manage your safety margin, by saying, “OK, it’s fine up to 
here, I’ll help and I’ll even help to make sure it doesn’t show too much.” But there is a point when I 
have to alert my superiors. “We have done this, we think it is a good idea to have done it, but we prefer to 
inform you that it has been done.” These situations are tremendously ambiguous. 
(Beverages, Zone Management Controller N°1) 
 
Moreover, the controller acquires a position as "arbiter" in relation to the various parties 
involved. They are a counterweight to totally opportunist behaviour that operational managers 
could show in a situation where the mechanisms of agency could possibly be biased.  
 
Well, as for the legitimacy of the controller, I sometimes wonder… In marketing, they have astonishing 
bonuses based on results. As a consequence, they ask you on tenterhooks whether they are on track 
for their earnings target… You are on the sidelines, unflustered: “No, well I don’t have a bonus… 
What interests me is that the figures hold water, I don’t care about your bonus”. It’s really rotten to 
the core at that level. It’s certainly a incentive, but it drives people to unhealthy behaviour… I’ve begun 
to realise this and it bugs me… 
(Media and Entertainment 2, Operational Management Controller) 
 
In  companies  with  a  strong  management  culture,  management  drift  resulting  from  bonus 
systems in particular is frowned upon by controllers. 
 
I think that they all have a financial culture. Marketers are focused on their margins, logisticians on 
respecting  their  budgets,  but  this  financial  culture  should  not  be allowed to take centre stage. 
Because we thrive thanks to marketing, I agree the financial culture must be very present, but it should 
remain secondary for operational managers. That’s not their job to know what their margin is. They must 
develop their markets, they must launch new products, they must have the backing of innovation, etc. X 
is about brands and developing markets. 
(Food producers and processors, Operational Management Controller) 
 
When we have had enough financial culture, and we realise that we are suffocating brands to release 
bigger margins and are not developing markets, we will come back to market development. […] We 
will always need to generate profitability for shareholders, but in the short-term we can’t afford to 
have that vision alone! 
(Food producers and processors, Business Unit Management Controller) 
 
Management controllers are fairly critical of operational managers’ financial obsession. They 
realise the short-term vision that the bonus game fosters, and feel compelled to take on a 
counterweight role in the organisation.  
This counterweight role is to be found in balancing the board’s strategic decisions and their 
feasibility  on  the  shop  floor.  When  these  decisions  seem  unreasonable  or  illegitimate, 
controllers seem ready to play an arbiter’s role, notably by performing profit manipulation. 
This is behaviour that they implicitly present to themselves as being ethical. 
 
This may seem surprising: this act cannot be considered as ethical from a universal point of 
view  because  profit  manipulation  prevents  high-level  managers  and  shareholders  from 
allocating resources in the best possible way. However, management controllers present this 
behaviour as ethical in the struggle they are leading against shareholders and head office. As 
such,  “profit  manipulation  is  a  morally  justifiable  means  of  resisting  the  oppression  and 
exploitation pressed on them by upper executives using management accounting systems as a 
major vehicle.” (Macintosh, 1995, p.306). It is a way to “clear some space and breathing 
room  between  the  business  component  and  the  injunctions  of  upper  level  executives” 
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Profit Manipulation: Different Incentives for Different Contexts 
The interviews that we conducted have enabled us to identify several earnings management 
policies by controllers. 
The two axes for these different policies seem to be shareholder pressure and the spread of a 
financial culture. Our second axis deals with the respective power of financiers and engineers 
(or operatives) in managing the companies concerned and the spread of the financial culture 
within the firm. From these two axes, four situations can be identified.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 Here> 
 
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
 
On  the  whole,  companies  of  configuration  1  are  either  in  the  public  sector  or  in  a 
monopolistic position. With a view to the opening of their markets in the medium term, these 
companies have their own management control departments, but the political will to impose a 
financial orientation on the organisation is not yet strong. Management controllers are seen as 
“cops”,  and  their  added  value  remains  hard  for  operational  managers  to  see.  In  these 
companies, no controller mentioned any attempt at managing earnings. 
 
Configuration 2 encompasses companies whose dominant culture is also technical, but which 
bear  high  shareholder  pressure.  In  all  these  companies,  management  controllers  mention 
profit  manipulation  as  a  common  practice.  Some  speak  more  cautiously  of  “work  on 
presentation”. However, earnings management does not always take place at the same level. 
In highly capital-intensive companies, where investment decisions are always long-term and 
condition  earnings  to  a  large  extent,  most  profit  manipulation  is  conducted  at  central 
headquarters.  In  companies  where  marketing  plays  a  major  role,  profit  manipulation  is 
performed  at  the  level  of  the  business  units.    In  those  companies  with  a  more  technical 
culture, earnings management by management controllers presents an opportunity for them to 
legitimate themselves with operational managers. It’s an opportunity for them to show their 
technical skills in accounting, to integrate more easily into the “operational life” of the unit 
and to manage far greater zones of uncertainty. 
 
In companies of configuration 3, management control is a concern shared by all. Operational 
managers and sometimes even management controllers are subject to remuneration systems 
tied  to  reaching  their  objectives.  The  presence  of  controllers  is  therefore  completely 
legitimate and earnings management is conducted at all levels. Nonetheless, the incentives 
driving controllers are very different here. Heavily involved in the daily operations of the 
unit, they sometimes perceive the market’s demands as unreasonable, and the company’s 
uniquely financial focus as a potential danger in the long term. Profit manipulation presents 
itself as a means for management controllers to play the role of counterweight, by according 
operational managers a certain margin for manoeuvre to implement more risky strategies or 
strategies whose return on investment is far more long term than what the market’s short-
sightedness would normally allow. 
 
None  of  the  companies  in  our  sample  seem  to  correspond  to  configuration  4.  Several 
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company that corresponded, given the small scale of our sample. We can also presume that 
companies not subject to shareholder pressure have no reason to develop a financial culture 
from within. Another option is that it is highly unlikely that companies with a strong financial 
culture will not be highly visible on the markets. 
 
 
From our observation of the spread of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model and from 
what  management  controllers  are  saying,  we  can  propose  a  model  explaining  profit 
manipulation. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 Here> 
 
How Valid is the Agency Model in a French context? 
Our empirical data enables us to draw a certain number of theoretical findings, firstly on the 
validity of the agency model as a basis for governance in a French cultural context. Profit 
manipulation performed by management controllers must be put in perspective. The Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance is consistent with a specific cultural context, and lends 
factual  data,  and  therefore  accounts,  a  special  status.  Indeed,  the  American  approach  to 
collecting and handling factual data is intimately tied to the American way of life. Judicial or 
quasi-judicial procedures, which are held in high esteem, give fundamental value to material 
proof. The way data is collected and used reflects the American preference for accounts that 
everyone should render public (d’Iribarne, 1989, p.103). Accounting statements correspond 
perfectly to this way of thinking. 
 
The French distinguish two roles factual data is likely to play: enabling us to understand 
better how things work; and providing a means of assessing people. In the French system, 
confusing  these  two  roles  (which  is  perfectly  legitimate  in  the  United  States)  generates 
resistance. The controller’s sense of responsibility alone (meaning what he feels responsible 
for, and not what he needs to account for) makes him pay attention to information he receives. 
The French model hardly encourages us to judge each person on the basis of such data and is 
opposed  to  superiors  demanding  accounts  that  are  too  stringent.  That  subordinates  may 
protect  themselves  from  all  hierarchical  “interference”  by  surrounding  their  activity  in  a 
shroud of opacity is not considered an illegitimate act. 
 
As a consequence, it is the legitimacy of accounts that lies at the heart of the debate in a 
French context. In general, accounts can be seen as perfectly legitimate by an individual, 
when  they  are  only  seen  as  signals  enabling  him  to  see  clearly  the  direct  and  indirect 
consequences  of  his  actions,  leaving  him  room  to  draw  his  own  conclusions.  Such  an 
approach seems well adapted to the way one’s sense of duty is expressed in French society. It 
is expected that accounts would encourage stakeholders in their actions to take into account 
what  a  narrow-minded  or  short-term  vision  of  their  responsibilities  would  lead  them  to 
neglect (d’Iribarne, 1989, p.106). 
 
In  the  Anglo-Saxon  model  of  governance,  accounts  are  part  of  a  conception,  which 
completely  opposes  what  would  most  likely  be  accepted  in  France.  Designed  as  strictly 
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factual data in France has no sacred value, changing or inventing it does not constitute a 
major  transgression.  From  that  point  on,  manipulating  accounts  seems  to  be  an  ethical 
practice, almost natural, an act so anchored in everyday values that individuals may not even 
be aware of it. 
Questioning the Relevance of Positive Accounting Theory  
Positive  accounting  theory  (PAT),  which  studies  accounting  choices,  has  been  overly 
interested  in  earnings  management.  Despite  this  attention,  “academic  research  has  shown 
limited evidence of earnings management” (Dechow and Skinner, 2000, p.235). This lack of 
evidence leads us to question the relevance of PAT. Nevertheless, we do not try to consider 
all the numerous methodological, theoretical and epistemological criticisms that have been 
levelled against PAT
9. Instead, we focus on two points: the methodology chosen, and the 
“model of man.” 
 
Positive  accounting  theory  positions  itself  in  an  objective  perspective  which  consists  in 
discerning earnings management from accounting documents, and checking the validity of 
economic  hypotheses  formulated  on  the  behaviour  of  managers  regarding  earnings 
management. This methodological choice is relatively incongruous for a field of research, 
which in the words of Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p.147) is in an “exploratory stage”.  
Moreover, PAT researchers examine large samples of firms to make general statements about 
earnings management. Dechow and Skinner (2000, p.236) argue that researchers “tend to use 
statistical definition of earnings management that may not be very powerful in identifying 
earnings management”, and conclude that “the current research methodologies simply are not 
that good at identifying earnings management”. 
 
Dealing with the model of actors, Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p.150) assert that, “the study 
of accounting is a social science. An accounting theory that seeks to explain and predict 
accounting cannot divorce accounting research from the study of people. The contracting 
approach  to  studying  accounting  requires  researchers  to  understand  the  incentives  of 
contracting  parties.”  However,  they  hold  to  a  fairly  summary  economic  and  opportunist 
modelling  of  manager  behaviour  based  on  the  network  of  contracts  which  a  manager  is 
involved in. They add that “the [positive accounting] literature explains why accounting is 
used and provides a framework for predicting accounting choices, […] choices are made in 
terms of individual objectives and the effects of accounting methods on the achievement of 
those objectives.” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p.150).  
Nevertheless, if explaining opportunist behaviour ex-post seems straightforward, predicting it 
ex-ante is difficult. Like the agency theory, PAT relies on the model of a rational actor who 
looks to optimise his utility at any given moment in time (Merchant et al., 2003, p.271). Both 
theories postulate that agents always display opportunistic behaviour. This model claims to 
reflect  relationships  between  shareholders  and  directors,  and  managers  and  workers 
objectively (Chwastiak, 1998, p.428). However, the rationality and utilitarianism hypotheses 
on which it lies are reflections of ideological presuppositions to a large extent (Broadbent et 
al., 1996). Aren’t agency theoreticians victims of “scholastic fallacy” by portraying man as a 
                                                 








































0  21 
rational  calculator  in  all  situations  (Bourdieu,  1994,  p.222)?
10  Whilst  studying  the  social 
realm can only be achieved by considering that “social agents don’t just do any old thing, that 
they are not mad, and that they don’t act without purpose” (Bourdieu, 1994, p.150), this 
doesn’t necessarily mean they are opportunists. “Practice has a logic which isn’t that of logic 
and,  as  a  result,  applying  logical  logic  to  practical  logic  is  to  risk  destroying,  with  the 
instrument  we  are  using  to  describe  it,  the  logic  we  want  to  describe”  (Bourdieu,  1994, 
p.157). To avoid this pitfall, we have sought to understand practices, to find the reasons that 
drive people to act as they do. We have noted that management controllers give reasons for 
manipulating  profits  that  differ  according  to  their  position:  a  search  for  legitimacy  or  an 
ethical stance. We cannot therefore reduce this behaviour to the level of opportunism as put 
forward by PAT. 
 
Trying  to  predict  behaviour  without  trying  to  understand  it  is  an  illusion.  This  way  of 
modelling  behaviour  therefore  teaches  us  very  little  about  what  drives  the  behaviour  of 
accounting decision-makers. These critics question Watt and Zimmerman’s argument about 
theory validity
11.
 Does the PAT acceptance and use by the scientific community necessarily 
imply its validity? Is this not simply the shadow of economic imperialism passing over the 
field of accounting research (Reiter, 1988)?  
The Paradoxical Place of Accounting Information in the Anglo-Saxon Model of 
Corporate Governance 
This  study  sheds  light  on  the  internal  contradictions  of  the  principal-agent  model,  and 
particularly on the paradoxical place that accounting data holds in this model. The standards 
of  Anglo-Saxon  governance  lead  to  the  model  of  contractual  relationships  presented  in 
agency theory being applied (Davis & Useem, 2002, p.236). Agency theory postulates that, in 
an agency situation, if the interests of the agent differ from those of the principal, the agent 
will display opportunist behaviour to the detriment of the principal. This must be solved by 
establishing incentive systems that bring the interests of the agent into line with those of the 
principal. This is why accounting plays a key role in the Anglo-Saxon model of governance 
(Ogden, 1993, p.185). 
 
Despite its weaknesses, the ideological force of the agency model has allowed it to spread 
through different cultural models. Our interviews show that the widespread adoption of the 
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance in French companies (and, as a result, of the 
contracting relationship and accounting mode that is associated with it) is leading to a rise in 
the practice of profit manipulation by management controllers
12. In the Anglo-Saxon model of 
                                                 
10 With this in mind, we may question what is the real contribution of theoretical and analytical literature (for an 
example, see studies by Dutta & Gigler, 2002 and Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002) 
11 Indeed, what better way to respond to criticism than by saying, “the criticisms have failed because they have 
had little influence on accounting research” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p.149) and by adding that “the best 
theory is determined in a competition to meet the demand from students and practitioners for theories that 
explain and predict accounting” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p.150). 
12 Profit manipulation is considered an opportunist practice in PAT, which engenders the following paradox: the 
more agency theoreticians succeed in imposing an organisational model which is optimal in the context of 
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governance,  accounting  is  both  an  input  into  the  system  (because  it  enables  agency 
relationships to be managed), and an output (because it relies on measures of institutional 
governance  working)  (Sloan,  2001).  As  such,  accounting  fulfils  several  functions 
(forecasting, resources allocation, control, and personal appraisal) and these various issues 
conspire to reduce its reliability. This creates the following paradox: the more accounting is 
necessary for governance, the less the information it provides is relevant. 
 
These  results lead us to investigate the risks associated with profit manipulation. Indeed, 
“most  people  think  that  earnings  management  is  a  bad  thing  because  […]  it  reduces  the 
relevance of financial information” (Scott, 1997, p.307). However, to a certain extent, profit 
manipulation seems to fulfil a necessary role in the efficient running of companies in an 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance context. As we have pointed out, it may even take on an 
ethical nature. It ensures that risks may be taken which are necessary for economic activity 
without discrediting high-level management. 
 
This  confirms  Dechow  and  Skinner’s  (2000,  p.247)  affirmation  that  “no  earnings 
management is clearly not an optimal solution.” Some earnings management is expected and 
should exist on capital markets.” 
                                                                                                                                                          
1996), the more tenants of PAT feel that accounting choices result from opportunist behaviour and the more 
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Conclusion 
In this article, we have proposed an interpretation of the practice of profit manipulation based 
on interviews with thirty-two management controllers from thirteen different companies. 
 
One major factor that explains this phenomenon emerges from our interviews: the shift in 
corporate governance and the rise in shareholder pressure that accompanies it. In companies 
with  a  weak  financial  culture,  changes  in  the  rules  of  the  game  relating  to  increased 
shareholder  pressure  give  management  controllers  the  opportunity,  given  their  technical 
know-how,  to  strengthen  their  legitimacy  with  operational  managers  by  helping  them  to 
manipulate profit. In companies with a developed financial culture, management controllers 
feel the dangers of an exclusively financial focus. Taking part in profit manipulation is one 
way of playing a new role: that of arbiter between the expectations of the markets and the 
actual business context. Dechow and Skinner (2000) criticise academic studies for having 
accorded too much importance to “contractual incentives” to the detriment of “capital markets 
incentives” in studying profit manipulation. Our research leads us to believe, however, that 
these two forms of incentive are very often intrinsically linked. 
 
From a more distant perspective, we may ask whether or not, before adding another layer of 
legislation  on  governance,  we  should  question  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  model  that 
underlies it (Batsch, 2002). Some commentators even believe in the “End of History, that is to 
say the definitive supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon model of governance, but recent scandals 
force us to think about alternative models (Perez, 2003). 
 
Thus, Davis and Useem (2002, p.233) affirm that “earnest attempts to meet the demands of 
shareholders  for  transparency  and  accountability,  as  prescribed  by  the  agency  theory  of 
governance,  often  have  unintended  consequences.  Firms  that  improve the quality of their 
disclosures attract more transient institutional investors, which in turn increases the volatility 
of their share prices –exactly the opposite of what was anticipated.” In the same way, we may 
ask if the spread of Anglo-Saxon practices of governance in countries that do not follow the 
same  cultural  patterns,  especially  those  that  have  a  different  approach  to  contracting 
(d’Iribarne, 1989), may not have unexpected consequences, resulting in the multiplication of 
profit manipulation practices at all levels and reducing the relevance of financial statements at 
the very moment that they are becoming the principle mechanism of governance. 
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ACCOUNTING CHOICES  DEFINITIONS
13  U.S. CASES  FRENCH CASES 
Within Accounting Standards 
Overly aggressive recognition 





Overevaluation of acquired in-
process R&D in purchase 
acquisitions 
Whole  industries  have  been  remade  through 
consolidations,  acquisitions  and  spin-offs.  Some 
companies have no choice but to use purchase accounting 
- which can result in lower future earnings.  But that's a 
result some companies are unwilling to tolerate. So what 
do they do? They classify an ever-growing portion of the 
acquisition  price  as  "in-process"  Research  and 
Development, so the amount can be written off in a "one-
time" charge - removing any future earnings drag. 
“Multibillion-dollar  charges  [were]  taken 
by  high-tech  acquirers  such  as  Compaq 
Computer  Corp.  and  WorldCom  Inc.  to 
write off “in-process” research when they 
close a deal.” (Byrnes et. al, 1998) 
 
BIG BATH  
RESTRUCTURING CHARGES  
Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs 
 
Companies remain competitive by regularly assessing the 
efficiency and profitability of their operations.  Problems 
arise, however, when we see large charges associated with 
companies’ restructuring. These charges help companies 
"clean up" their balance sheet -- giving them a so-called 
"big bath." 
“In  March  1998,  the  SEC  compelled  the 
company  [3  Com]  to  reduce  its 
restructuring charge for the 1997 purchase 
of  U.S.  Robotics  Corp  to  $279  million 
from  $426  million,  because  3  Com  had 
overestimated  the  associated  expenses.” 
(Barr, 1998).  
 
Earnings that result from a 




Understatement of the 
provision for bad debt and 
drawing down provisions or 




“Alstom,  the  French  engineering 
group  had  discovered 
"significantly  understated  losses" 
on a railway carriage contract at its 
US transport subsidiary which had 
forced  it  to  take  a  Euros  51m 
(Dollars  58m)  charge.”  (Arnold, 
2003) 
Table 1 - Practices of Earnings Management 
Adapted from Dechow &Skinner (2000) and Levitt (1998) 
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Violates Accounting Standards 
ACCOUNTING CHOICES  DEFINITIONS
14  U.S. CASES  FRENCH CASES 
IMMATERIAL MISAPPLICATION 
Some companies misuse the concept of materiality. 
They  intentionally  record  errors  within  a  defined 
percentage ceiling. They then try to excuse that fib 
by arguing that the effect on the bottom line is too 
small to matter. 
   
PREMATURE RECOGNITION OF 
REVENUE 
Recording sales before they are 
“realizable” 
Some companies are recognizing a revenue before a 
sale is complete, before the product is delivered to a 
customer, or at a time when the customer still has 
options to terminate, void or delay the sale. 
“MicroStrategy Inc. reported revenue in three 
quarters in 1998 and 1999 based on contracts 
it did not complete until after the quarters had 
ended,  the  SEC  found.”  (Henry,  Schmitt, 
2001) 
 
Recording fictitious sales 
 
 
“Altran Technologies had to reduce its 
former reported revenue by 48% for 
the first quarter because of fictitious 
and atypical sales.” (Fay, 2003) 
Backdating sales invoices       
Overstating inventory by 
recording fictitious inventory 
 
 
“Marionnaud confessed an error about 
evaluating inventory, that had 
increased its 2001 EBIT by  € 2.5 
million”. (Lejoux, 2003) 
Table 1 (continued-1)- Practices of Earnings Management 
Adapted from Dechow &Skinner (2000) and Levitt (1998) 
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“REAL” CASH FLOW 
CHOICES 
DEFINITIONS  U.S. ILLUSTRATIONS  FRENCH ILLUSTRATIONS 
COOKIE JAR RESERVES 
 Delaying sales 
Using  unrealistic  assumptions  to  estimate  liabilities  for 
such items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty costs. 
In doing so, companies stash accruals in cookie jars during 
the good times and reach into them when needed in the 
bad times. 
   
Accelerating / Postponing R&D 
or advertising expenditures 
     
CHANNEL STUFFING 
Accelerating sales 
Selling goods to customers who aren’t ready to buy yet. 
To make the deal attractive to the buyer, the seller often 
finances the purchase interest free and, in some cases, 
picks up the cost of storing the goods until the customer 
is ready to take delivery (Collingwood, 2001). 
In order to post the earnings gains that 
supported  the  price  of  Sunbeam’s 
stock, Dunlop sold millions of dollars 
worth of backyard grills to customers 
like Sears and Wal-Mart in the middle 
of,  the  Winter.[…].  Sunbeam  booked 
the  sales  immediately  but  let  its 
customers  defer  payment  until  the 
Spring. (Collingwood, 2001) 
 
Table 1 (continued-2)- Practices of Earnings Management 
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Head Office  Business Units  SECTORS 
(FTSE™ Global Classification 
System)  C.F.O.  Zone/ 
Branch 
Reporting/ 






Mining  1             
Oil and Gas    2           
Steel and other metals  1             
Automobile and Parts 1          1     
Automobile and Parts 2  1      1       
Beverages    2           
Food producers and processors        1  1  5  1 
Personal Care and Household 
products      1  1    4  1 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology            1   
Media and Entertainment 1            1   
Media and Entertainment 2            1   
Transport  1    1      2   
Utilities    1           
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PRACTICES  EXAMPLES 
HIDING REVENUES 
COOKIE JAR RESERVES 
“You find yourself with a really super month of December, 
or you’ve kept reserves all over the place—the rule is 60/40, 
which means you always try to have at least a 60% chance 
of reaching your target and a 40% risk of not reaching it, so 
you stash reserves all over—or it just so happens sales have 
been very good, so you find yourself with loads of reserves. 
What you generally try and do then—and all management 
controllers will tell you the same thing—is not to disclose 
this  fact,  but  to  keep  the  jackpot  for  the  following  year. 
Well,  let’s  say  that  it’s  something  you  conform  to  fairly 
naturally  because  it  also  makes  it  easier  for  you  to  pilot 
things  and  everything  remains  vague.  What  is  the  real 
result? What is the official result? Etc.” 
(Beverages, Zone Operational Management Controller N°1) 
CREATING CHARGES 
Accelerating R&D or advertising 
expenditures 
“It could be a question of ‘lumping 100% of advertising costs 
together  at  the  end  of  the  year’.  For  us,  the  accounting 
principle is to amortise your advertising. But if a collection 
goes badly, we do not amortise it, we account for it 100%. 
This will make your result slump.” 
(Media and Entertainment 2, Operational Management 
Controller) 
INCREASING CHARGES 
Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves 
“Amortisation  is  very  heavy.  This  is  a  capital-intensive 
industry and amortizations represent twice as much mass as 
production  costs.  So,  amortizations  and  forecasts,  if  only 
forecasts for rehabilitating sites—when we finish production, 
we have to rehabilitate the site—are very important, as they 
provide certain room for manoeuvre due to the fact that they 
are  estimated  costs.  There  are  very  precise  rules—we 
amortise at the production unit level, meaning according to 
the  production  of  a  given  well—but  it  effectively  gives 
greater leverage when disclosing our results... as we are able 
to adjust them in relation to our activity.” 
(Oil and Gas Industry, Branch Management Controller) 
 































































Figure 1: The Positioning of the Different Companies Studied
15 
                                                 
15 The companies were placed in this matrix following interviewees’ comments and information taken from 
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Figure 2 : Model of Profit Manipulation by Management Controllers 
 
Spread of Anglo-Saxon model of corporate  
New demands in terms of: 
·  Value creation  
·  Transparency 
·  Frequency of disclosure 
·  Financial measure of performance 
The accounting baseline becomes essential. 
Environment that is often 
difficult to control 
Impossible for managers to reconcile market 
expectations and operational constraints 
PROFIT MANIPULATION 
By management controllers 
If the financial culture is not 
dominant, the management 
controller tries to legitimise his 
place in the organisation, to find 
recognition for his technical skills 
and his role. 
If the financial culture is dominant, 
the management controller may be 
a counterweight, an arbiter 
between the potentially 
unreasonable expectations of the 
markets and what operatives can 
realistically achieve. 
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